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1. Introduction
Currency markets are continuously flooded with information. In spite of intensive research, the
adjustment of exchange rates to this stream of information is still not fully understood. Previous
research on the reaction of exchange rates to new information has mainly focused on the effects of
(scheduled) announcements of macroeconomic variables. Still, it is likely that the (expected) actions
of a central bank also influence exchange rates, especially in the short run. The central bank may
change interest rates and has the opportunity to intervene in foreign exchange markets. The use of
these instruments may have important effects on the value of the currency. Central bankers may also
try to affect exchange rates by their communications. There is, however, hardly any research explicitly
analyzing the impact of statements by central bank officials, the studies by Tivegna (2001) and Fatum
and Hutchison (2002) being exceptions. 
This paper studies the effects of statements made by European Central Bank (ECB) officials
on the level and volatility of the euro-dollar exchange rate for the period January 4, 1999 to May 17,
2002. This was a very turbulent period in which the depreciation of the euro was rather problematic
for the ECB. Before its introduction the euro was widely expected to be a strong currency. Some even
hoped (or feared) that the euro would compete with the dollar in its role as most important
international currency (see Eijffinger and De Haan, 2000 for a discussion).
1 As the new currency was
an important symbol for the EMU, its decline led some people even to question the overall success of
the EMU. Apart from this image problem, the extensive depreciation of the euro was also a serious
threat to price stability in the euro area (see De Haan et al., 2003). After some time, the ECB reacted
by intervening in the foreign exchange market to support the euro. The success of these interventions
is under debate.
2 Apart from interventions, the ECB has been very active to support the euro verbally
(‘talking up the currency’). As we will see, many ECB officials have publicly expressed the view that
the euro was undervalued during the period under consideration. 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate how central bankers’ statements are related to daily
exchange rate changes. We apply the so-called ‘news’ approach to test for effects of ECB statements.
This approach rests on two assumptions (see e.g. De Grauwe et al., 1993): the exchange rate should be
modeled as an asset price and expectations are formed rationally. These assumptions imply that only
unexpected information or ‘news’ about fundamentals should change the exchange rate as all currently
                                                          
1 The exchange rate regime may also affect other financial markets. See, for instance, Cheung and Westermann
(2001) who report that even though the introduction of the euro did not affect the relationship between German
and US equity markets, the volality of the German stock index has fallen significantly since the introduction of
the euro.
2 Whereas many observers question the effectiveness of interventions, Fatum and Hutchison (2002) claim that
the first of the four interventions that they identify had some success. See Sarno and Taylor (2001) for a review
of the literature on foreign exchange interventions. A recent study finding support for the effectiveness of
interventions is Fatum and Hutchison (2003). See also Frenkel et al. (2001). According to the survey of Cheung
and Chinn (2000), traders in forex markets belief that interventions increase volatility. At the same time, they do
not consider central bank interventions very successful.2
available information is already reflected in current prices. We use an EGARCH specification that
allows us to test for effects on the mean as well as on volatility. Even though it has been found that
‘news’ is rapidly incorporated into exchange rates (see, e.g., Cheung and Chinn (2000) who find that
forex traders believe that the bulk of the adjustment takes place even within just one minute after the
release of new information), we use daily observations like Fatum and Hutchison (2002) and Galati
and Ho (2002). This is justified, as we are mainly interested in the effectiveness of statements of ECB
officials. If the effects of ‘talking up the currency’ can only be observed using higher frequency data,
ECB statements cannot be considered a very powerful instrument to influence developments at the
foreign exchange market. 
We collected statements of various central bankers - including statements of officials of
national central banks in the euro area - as reported by the Bloomberg News Service. We find that
statements of Bundesbank officials outnumber those of other central bankers. Our results indicate  that
ECB statements have had a larger impact on volatility than on the level of the exchange rate. Efforts of
the ECB to ‘talk up’ the currency have not been successful. Our results also indicate that there has
been an asymmetric reaction to ‘news’: the market reacts differently to positive and negative ‘news’. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses previous papers that
study the relationship between ‘news’ and the exchange rate. Section 3 discusses our methodology and
the data, while section 4 describes the statement data in detail. Section 5 presents the results. Section 6
offers some concluding comments.  
2.  The effect of ‘news’ on exchange rates: a survey of the recent literature
According to the efficient market hypothesis only unexpected information or ‘news’ should have an
effect on the exchange rate. It is common to test for ‘news’ effects by estimating some version of
equation (1)
3:
t1 t 2 t 3  t   t R =   +   EX +   UX+  Z +     αβ β β ε                                (1)
where Rt is the exchange rate return (defined as first differences in the log of the exchange rate), EXt is
a matrix with expectations, UXt is a matrix with ‘news’ variables, and Zt is a matrix with control
variables
4. 
Table 1 summarizes various papers studying the effect of ‘news’ on exchange rates. We focus on
the following elements: the choice of ‘news’, the manner in which ‘news’ is measured, the
                                                          
3 The idea that ‘news’ - that is, innovations in certain variables - causes the bulk of movements in exchange rates
has a history going at least as far back as Frenkel (1981). 
4 Rigobon and Sack (2002) and Evans and Lyons (2003) advocate the use of a new approach,  based on state
dependent heteroscedasticity.3
econometric framework, and the frequency at which the exchange rate is sampled. It follows from
Table 1 that: 
•  most papers focus on scheduled macroeconomic announcements, 
•  ‘news’ is measured by dummies or as the difference between expectation and realization,
•  most studies employ either OLS or GARCH models,
•  most researchers use high frequency data.
The earlier papers in this field use ordinary least squares regressions and generally do not include
control variables. Hakkio and Pearce (1985) study short-run responses of spot exchange rates to three
categories of economic announcements: money growth, inflation and real activity. They use survey
results to proxy the expected part of the announcements. Their exchange rate series has three
observations per trading day. These authors find that the exchange rate reacts to unexpected changes in
the money stock. Ito and Roley (1987) study reactions of the yen-dollar exchange rate to ‘news’ from
Japan and the U.S. They use intra-day data (four observations per trading day). These authors find that
the yen-dollar exchange rate was mainly driven by ‘news’ from the U.S. 
Improved data availability enabled researchers to use high frequency data in order to separate
the effects of ‘news’ from the other factors influencing the exchange rate. Another innovation was the
use of dummies to quantify ‘news’. The papers of Ederington and Lee (1993) and Goodhart et al.
(1993) combine these two aspects. Ederington and Lee (1993) examine the impact of nineteen types of
scheduled macroeconomic announcements on the volatility of the U.S. dollar-German mark exchange
rate. These authors use dummies that are equal to one when an announcement is made and zero
otherwise. They find that the dollar-mark exchange rate is influenced by announcements on
merchandise trade, employment, retail sales, the producer prices index and GNP. Goodhart et al.
(1993) focuses on two particular events: a release of US trade figures and an interest rise in the UK.
These authors conclude that these events significantly change the time-series behavior of the exchange
rate. 
The majority of the papers summarized in Table 1 focus on scheduled macroeconomic
announcements. The papers by DeGenarro and Shrieves (1997), Tivegna (2001) and Fatum and
Hutchison (2002) are exceptions. DeGenarro and Shrieves (1997) estimate the impact of market
activity and ‘news’ on the volatility of the yen-dollar exchange rate. They use quote arrival as a proxy
for market activity and the number of news headlines in the Reuters news service as a proxy for
‘news’. These authors distinguish three categories: macroeconomic announcements, economic policy
announcements and interest rate reports. The last two categories contain unscheduled ‘news’. They
conclude that both private information and ‘news’ are important determinants of exchange rate
volatility. 4
Table 1: Selected papers that test for news effects
News variables How news is
measured























































































































Tivegna (2001) estimates a daily exchange rate model for both the German mark-dollar and
the yen-dollar exchange rate. He distinguishes between scheduled (mostly quantitative) and non-
scheduled (mostly qualitative) announcements. He identifies the following five categories in the latter
category: market information and opinions, qualitative economic or political events, qualitative
descriptions of quantitative events, policy statements by leading politicians, ministers or central
bankers and official interventions in the foreign exchange markets. Tivegna concludes that statements
by policy makers are an important market mover for both exchange rates. The coefficients found for
political and market ‘news’ are, for example, much larger than those for ‘news’ on US macroeconomic
developments. 
Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) bring together three important factors that influence the
volatility of the German mark-dollar exchange rate. The first category are calendar effects, the second
category are macroeconomic announcements, while the final category are inter-daily volatility
dependencies or ARCH effects (see Hsieh (1988) and Hsieh (1989)). One important conclusion is that
the announcement effects are of secondary importance in explaining overall volatility. Announcements
have significant effects shortly after they were made, but they explain less of the volatility than the
other two factors. Almeida et al. (1998) support the conclusion of Andersen and Bollerslev (1998).
They study the reaction of the German mark-dollar exchange rate to macroeconomic announcements
using high frequency data. The announcements refer to U.S. and German data. Almeida et al. conclude
that after three hours most of the effect from the announcement has disappeared. The effects are
dwarfed by other events at the lower frequencies. 
The study by Andersen et al. (2002) is similar to Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) in scope and
modeling approach. The focus of this paper is, however, on the mean and not on the volatility of the
exchange rate. Andersen et al. characterize the conditional mean of the spot rate of the U.S. dollar
against five other currencies. Their model allows ‘news’ to affect the conditional mean as well as the
conditional variance. They find that, in general, ‘news’ has a statistically significant effect on the
exchange rate. The adjustment of the conditional mean in reaction to ‘news’ is very quick, whereas the
adjustment in volatility is more gradual. There is also evidence that the sign of the ‘news’ matters for
the response. Negative surprises have greater impact than positive surprises.
Finally, Galati and Ho (2001) and Fatum and Hutchison (2002) study ‘news’ effects for the
euro-dollar exchange rate. Galati and Ho (2001) examine the impact of macroeconomic
announcements. They investigate the relationship between scheduled macroeconomic ‘news’ and the
daily change in the euro-dollar exchange rate, focusing on the impact of U.S. and European
announcements during the first 2 years of EMU. These authors conclude that the unexpected parts of
macroeconomic announcements can explain up till 10% of the daily variation in the euro-dollar rate.
There is also evidence that the reaction to ‘news’ is asymmetric: good ‘news’ on the euro area has
been ignored, while bad ‘news’ had an influence. This result is in line with De Grauwe’s (2000)6
argument that given the great uncertainty about equilibrium levels of exchange rates, short-run
movements tend to be driven by technical and chartist analysis. Sustained movements in one direction
or another then lead to a search for fundamentals that explain these developments (framing). When the
exchange rate changes, a search starts for fundamentals that can explain the observed change. In this
way, a self-enforcing process can evolve: a declining euro is seen as evidence that there are problems
in the economy of the euro area. These problems then reinforce the downward movement of the euro.
So in a way, the causality is reversed: it is not the ‘news’ about fundamentals which drive the
exchange rate, but the exchange rate determines the way the fundamentals are perceived.
Fatum and Hutchison (2002) study the effects of ECB intervention and intervention-related
‘news’ on the euro-dollar exchange rate. These authors use a regression approach to determine which
‘news’ variables had effect on the euro and use an event study methodology to assess whether the
ECB interventions were successful. They use four categories of ‘news’: rumors of intervention by the
ECB, statements by officials in support of the euro, statements by officials not supportive of the euro
and reports of actual intervention. Rumors on intervention have a positive effect on the exchange rate
and statements not supportive of the euro have a negative effect on the euro rate. Interestingly, there is
an asymmetry between positive statements and negative statements: only the negative statements have
persistent effects. 
It follows from this analysis that the results as to which ‘news’ variables affect exchange rates
differ substantially between studies. This is in line with the results of more structural models that often
find parameter instability when relating so-called fundamentals to exchange rate developments. Also
the survey of Cheung and Chinn (2000) suggests that the importance of macro-economic variables
shifts over time. Another reason for the differences among the various studies may be the frequency of
the data. If ‘news’ is quickly absorbed, low frequency analysis may not be able to detect any influence. 
3.  Methodology 
3.1 Modeling strategy 
It is well established that exchange rate series are I(1) processes.
5 Therefore, we take the usual
approach to investigate the properties of the first differences of the natural logs of the exchange rate
series. Figure 1 plots this series. There is evidence of clustered volatility in the euro-dollar series.
Therefore, it seems logical to use a GARCH type model as a starting point. As results with a simple
GARCH (1,1) model were not satisfying (non-negativity constraints in the variance equation were
violated) we use the EGARCH model proposed by Nelson (1991). 
                                                          
5 Unit root tests for the sample period (available on request) confirm this hypothesis.8
Figure 1: Daily changes in the log of the euro-dollar series between 1-1-1999 and 5-17-2002
(see Hsieh 1988, 1989). Dk are dummy representing the ECB statements. They enter the mean as well
as the variance equation. Starting with this general approach, we proceed to eliminate non-significant
variables, using Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) to determine the appropriate number of lags.
Our model looks as follows:
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where Rt represents the change in the natural logarithm of the exchange rate. Equation (2) has n
autoregressive terms and dummies for the weekdays (Dw1.....Dw4) as control variables.
6 The error term
has a zero mean and a conditional variance ht. The weekday dummies also enter the variance equation
(see Hsieh 1988, 1989). Dk are dummies that represent the ECB statements. These dummies enter the
mean as well as the variance equation. Starting with this general approach, we then proceed to
eliminate irrelevant variables. This means dropping nonsignificant variables in order to reach a
parsimonious model. We use the Akaike information criterion to determine the appropriate number of
lags.
                                                          
6 We also estimated this model using interest differentials as additional control variables. This did not change our









3.2 Organizing the statements to construct  quantitative variables
We will now discuss the construction of the variables Dk. This paper studies the effects of unexpected
statements that are qualitative in nature. The literature suggests to use dummies for this purpose. These
dummies can be used to test for effects whenever someone makes a statement. However, as Tivegna
(2001) argues, the use of (0,1) dummies could incorrectly lead to non-significant results as the effects
of statements with a positive and negative content may cancel out. Therefore, he uses ternary variables
that record whether a statement has an expected positive, neutral or negative effect on the exchange
rate. Galati and Ho (2001) follow a similar approach. 
Our approach is to start with simple (0,1) occurrence dummies and then use dummies that take
the content of a statement into account. We do not quite follow the method suggested by Tivegna
(2001). Firstly, the interpretation of the coefficients in his approach is not straightforward. Therefore,
we prefer to construct three dummies for each category of statements. The coefficients of these
dummies can easily be interpreted. An additional benefit is that we can study whether there have been
asymmetric reactions to ‘news’. Secondly, assigning positive, neutral or negative values to statements
on macro-economic variables is rather problematic. The statements are qualitative in nature and
therefore difficult to interpret. Moreover, given the failure of empirical exchange rate models (Meese
and Rogoff, 1983), we lack a simple method on how to categorize statements on macro-economic
variables into positive, neutral and negative. We therefore start with a more neutral approach and
record - where possible - whether an ECB official states that a macro-economic variable, for example
inflation, will go up, down or remain the same. In doing this, we do not have to make controversial
prior assumptions on the effects of these statements. Fortunately, in some cases we are able to specify
our priors as to the effect of the statement.
We record the following basic characteristics of each statement: the day on which the
statement was made, the person who made the statement and the content of the statement. We sampled
all statements by ECB officials, as well as statements by officials of national central banks (NCBs) in
the euro area. We identify eight different kind of statements that we expect to be relevant for the
exchange rate (see Table 2). There are two main categories: monetary policy and the euro. There are
five subcategories in the monetary policy category. First of all, there are statements on interest rates in
the euro area. The remaining subcategories relate to the two-pillar strategy of the ECB. Firstly, there
are statements on money growth in the euro area (first pillar). Secondly, there are statements on
economic growth, inflation and the effects of the euro on inflation (second pillar). 
For statements in the first category, we record whether according to the statement a variable,
inflation say, will go up, or down, or will remain stable. It seems difficult to judge a priori what the
effect of these statements will be. Nevertheless, economic theory suggests a few possible outcomes.
Suppose that an ECB official indicates a bias towards higher rates. What may happen then? There are
three possibilities (see also Harris and Zabka 1995 for a good discussion): the statement may have an 10
effect either through an investor channel, an inflation channel and a growth channel. According to the
first channel, there will be a positive relationship between interest rates and the exchange rate: higher
rates makes buying European securities more attractive which will induce demand for euros. The
second channel works through prices. If purchasing power parity is a good description of reality,
higher interest rates will coincide with a fall in the euro. The final channel also predicts a negative
relationship between interest rates and growth: higher interest rates hamper investments and thus
hamper growth. Finally, note that we can generalize from this example on rates to the other four
variables from the monetary policy category. Higher money growth may, for instance,  lead to higher
rates etc.
Table 2: Categories of ECB statements
Category: Contains statements on:
(1) Monetary policy
Interest rates ECB interest rates
M3 Growth of money supply
Economic growth Real GDP growth in the euro area
Inflation Inflation in the euro area
Pass-through How the euro exchange rate will effect inflation in the
euro area
(2) The euro
Future value of euro Expectations on the value of the euro
No target versus inflation The position of the euro in the monetary policy strategy
Intervention  The possibility of intervention
The second main category that we distinguish is statements on the euro. Here we are able to
assign a prior as to the expected effect on the euro-dollar exchange rate. The first subcategory under
this heading contains statements expressing beliefs on the future direction of the exchange rate. In
section 4 we will show that, during most of the time under consideration, the ECB expressed the view
that the euro had potential to appreciate (positive effect). The second subcategory contains statements
trying to explain the position of the euro in the ECB monetary policy strategy. There have been many
of these statements in the sample period as the ECB has intensively communicated about its monetary
policy strategy in recent years.
7 Time and again, central bankers stressed that the external value of the
euro was not an objective for monetary policy. Nevertheless, the extensive depreciation of the euro11
forced them to take the euro-dollar rate into account when making monetary policy decisions. This ‘no
target/inflation’ problem may have led to confusion in currency markets. We characterize statements
that stress the ‘no target’ part as negative, while statements that stress the possible effect on inflation
are considered to have a positive effect. Finally, there are statements on the possibility of intervention.
During the period under consideration, there has been a lot of speculation on possible intervention. In
a similar vein as Fatum and Hutchison (2002), we test how markets have reacted to this news.
Statements that suggest the possibility of intervention are expected to have a positive effect on the
exchange rate, statements that deny possible intervention may have negative effects. 
In order to see whether effects differ between (groups of) ECB officials, we construct
dummies that for each day record whether or not a certain official made a statement on that day. In
addition, we tried to construct variables that combine the results from these person dummies with
those from the content of the statements. However, combining these two perspectives results in
variables with very low variation and few data points (i.e., a lot of zeros out of a possible 880).
Although this route is certainly very interesting, our data set is simply not rich enough to explore it
further. 
Finally, note that there is a difference in the number of observations between the statements
series and the exchange rate series. Obviously, there is only one data point per day for the exchange
rate series. However, there can be more than one statement per day. In addition, statements can be
made during the weekend when trading activity is generally low. To synchronize the series, we add the
statements made during the weekend to the scores for Monday. We also added up the different scores
if we found more than one observation per trading day.
3.3 Data sources
The sample period ranges from January 4, 1999 until May 17, 2002, yielding 880 observations. The
data set with ECB statements was collected from the Bloomberg News Service.
8 This was done by
scanning the daily headlines for keywords like ECB or names of ECB officials. We selected some 930
news reports in which ECB statements are reported. The criterion for including a statement is that it
has to refer to the entire euro area. Statements on developments in individual countries were not
included. We focus on unexpected statements, because we expect to find the greatest effects in these
cases. For this reason, the monthly ECB press conferences are not included in our data set. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
7 Whether the ECB has been very successful in becoming transparent is another matter. See De Haan et al.
(2003) for a detailed analysis of the transparency of the ECB.
8 We kindly thank Het Financieele Dagblad for allowing us to use their Bloomberg terminal.12
The exchange rate and interest series are taken from Datastream. The exchange rates are New
York noon spot rates (dollars per euro). This means that the cut off point for a trading day is 18.00
CET.
9 The interest rates we use are one-month inter-bank rates.
4.  Description of the statement dummies
4.1 Central bankers
Table 3 displays the statements dummies for three groups of central bankers and some selected
individuals. National central bank presidents made statements on 336 trading days compared to a
figure of 256 for the Executive Board of the ECB. We find 82 statements for Bundesbank officials
(excluding the president of the German central bank). For no other European central bank do we find
such a large amount of statements by its officials. 
Table 3: Statement dummies for persons
Total number of statements
Groups
Executive Board 256
National Central Bank Presidents 336





    Tietmeyer 
a) 24




The numbers in this table show the number of trading days on which particular statements were made. 
a) 04/01/1999 until
31/08/1999
b) 01/09/1999 until 17/05/2002
                                                          
9 Except during two weeks per year when  U.S. and European D.S.T. are not synchronized. The cut off point
then is 19.00 C.E.T.13
Table 3 also shows that the Bundesbank president has made more comments that any other ECB
official. We find statements by either Tietmeyer or Welteke for 179 trading days, compared to 92 for
Duisenberg and 95 for Trichet. Together with the 82 statements of other Bundesbank officials, in
terms of total number of statements the German central bank ranks even higher than the Executive
Board of the ECB. There are two possible explanations for this. First, financial markets may still
attach greater importance to the Bundesbank than to the ECB. The ECB is a new institution that has
not yet established a firm reputation. The German central bank in contrast, is a venerable institution
that has proven its capability in monetary policy-making over the years. Financial market do not yet
know how to judge the new situation and still attach great importance to Bundesbank statements for
this reason. However, this explanation assumes that Bloomberg selects news in such a way, that the
statements of Bundesbank officials receive most attention. This seems rather unlikely. Since it is
Bloomberg’s business to bring as much news as possible, we can safely assume that a bias in the news
coverage does not exist. 
Alternatively, it may be argued that the Bundesbank has not yet learnt to cope with its new
role within the European System of Central Banks. For years, the Bundesbank has dominated
monetary policy in Europe. All this has changed, however, and the Bundesbank had to step back in
favor of the ECB. The fact that Bundesbank officials communicated so intensively to financial
markets may reflect their difficulty in accepting this new situation. 
4.2 Content
Table 4 presents our data referring to the content of the ECB statements. The numbers in the table
show the number of trading days on which statements of a particular category were made. For
example, there were neutral statements on interest rates on 173 out of the 881 trading days. There were
indications of higher rates on 36 trading days and indications of lower rates on 12 trading days. It
follows from Table 4 that the number of statements on money growth is relatively small compared to
those on the second pillar of the monetary policy strategy. The statements on growth are generally
positive (i.e., indicating that the outlook for growth is good), whereas the statements on inflation are
more balanced. One reason could be, that statements on inflation may sooner lead to speculation on
interest rate changes. This may cause ECB officials to be more careful when talking about inflation.
Finally, there are statements on the pass-through of the depreciation of the euro into higher inflation
on 100 trading days. Most of these statements (51) indicate higher risks for inflation.14
Table 4: The content of the ECB statements
Up Neutral  Down Total
Monetary policy
Interest rates 36 173 12 221
M3 27 27 29 83
Economic growth 194 25 35 254
Inflation 79 111 90 280
Pass-through 51 39 10 100
Positive Neutral Negative Total
The euro
Future value of euro 172 6 2 180
No target versus inflation 112 24 42 178
Intervention 17 22 18 57
Notes: The numbers in this table show the number of trading days on which particular statements were made. Totals for
Tables 3 and 4 do not add up, because one news item may refer to statement on more than one category.
There are many statements referring to the second main category. Of special interest is the sub-
category ‘future value of the euro’. ECB officials made positive statements on the euro on 172 trading
days. Only 2 statements were negative and 6 were neutral, reflecting the efforts of the ECB to ‘talk up
the euro’.
The sub-category ‘no target versus inflation’ contains 178 statements. This large number of
statements indicates that the ECB has made great efforts to explain the role of the euro in its monetary
policy strategy. It is somewhat surprising that the majority of statements are positive. This may have
led markets to believe there was some sort of target for the euro-dollar exchange rate. 
Finally, we recorded statements on (possible) intervention for 57 trading days. Of these
statements 17 raised the probability of intervention, 22 were neutral and 18 lowered the probability of
intervention by the ECB. 15
5. Results 
5.1 Statements of central bankers
The best EGARCH specification for the euro-dollar exchange rate is reported in the first column of
Table 5. The weekday dummies in the mean equation were always non-significant, so they are
excluded in the remainder of the analysis. We also found that adding more than one autoregressive
term in the mean equation was not necessary on the basis of the AIC. For the variance equation we
prefer an EGARCH(1,1) model. Adding more EGARCH terms did not add much to the model. A
robust result is the lower conditional variance on the Monday. The dummy for Friday is also
significant, but the coefficient displays more variation between different specifications.
10 
Next, we added dummies reflecting whether there was a statement by any ECB official or not.
The second column of Table 5 presents the regression results. We do not find any significant effect of
these statements for the mean of the exchange rate. However, there is a significant increase in
volatility after the day the statement was made. Volatility is approximately 27% higher in these
cases.
11 Interestingly, this coincides with the findings of Cheung and Chinn (2000) for central bank
interventions: forex traders believe that interventions mainly affect the volatility of exchange rates. 
Do these conclusions hold for different groups of ECB officials as well? Our results indicate
that for Executive Board members there is also evidence for an increase in volatility (column 3 of
Table 5). The coefficient of the lagged value of the statement dummy is 0.21, indicating, once again,
an increase in volatility of 27%. Statements by Bundesbank officials (excluding the president) have no
effect on volatility, but there are temporary and off-setting effects on the mean (column 4 of Table 5).
There is an appreciation of 0.17% on the trading day itself and a subsequent depreciation of  0.12% on
the day thereafter. According to a Wald test, the total effect turns out to be not significantly different
from zero. 
                                                          
10 Given the exponential specification a coefficient in the variance equation that is smaller (larger) than zero
indicates lower (higher) variance.
11 10
0.21≈1.62. We use the standard deviation to measure volatility, so volatility increases with (√1.62)-116
Table 5: Results for groups of ECB officials
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No statement dummies,
EGARCH model




Constant -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
AR(1) 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04
Statement dummies - - - 0.0016***
Statement dummies
(1st lag)
- - - -0.0012*
Variance equation
(equation 4)
Constant -10.45*** -8.47*** -9.67*** -10.15***




δ1 -0.05 0.16 0.01 -0.04
δ2 -0.18* -0.14 -0.17* -0.19*
δ3 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
Monday -0.50*** -0.62*** -0.56*** -0.53***
Friday 0.27* - -0.27* -0.27*
Adjusted R
2 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00
DW 1.98 1.98 1.98 1.98
Notes:
This table shows EGARCH models for the euro-dollar exchange rate (equations 3 and 4 in the main text). In
column (1) no statement dummies are included. In column (2) all statements by ECB officials are taken up. In column (3)
only statements by members of the Executive Board are included, while in column (4) statements by officials of the German
central bank (excl. the president of the Bundesbank) are shown. Bollerslev-Woolridge robust standard errors and covariance
are used. */**/*** denotes significance at the 10/5/1 % level, respectively.17
Next, we added occurrence dummies for all 18 members of the ECB Governing Council.
Initially, we used all dummies in the estimation. We then proceeded to eliminate non-significant
dummies. Not entirely unexpected, statements by Duisenberg, the Bundesbank president, and Trichet
turn out to be of importance. Table 6 shows the results. After eliminating non-significant variables and
using the AIC to determine the appropriate number of lags, we find the best specification only has
statement dummies in the mean equation. Statements by Duisenberg and the Bundesbank president
coincide with a depreciation of the euro. In contrast, statements by Trichet coincide with an
appreciation. 





Duisenberg (1st lag) -
Bundesbank president -0.0013**
Bundesbank president (1st lag)
Trichet 0.0015**
Trichet (1st lag) 
Variance equation
Constant -8.39***
Bundesbank president (1st lag) -
Trichet -









Notes: This table shows EGARCH models for the euro-dollar exchange rate (equations 3 and 4 in the main text). Bollerslev-
Woolridge robust standard errors and covariance are used. */**/*** denotes significance at the 10/5/1 % level, respectively.18
5.2 Effects of statements on intervention, the euro and inflation
We now turn to the content of the statements. As a first approach, we use occurrence dummies to test
for effects of statements, independent of whether the statement was positive, neutral or negative. We
analyze two cases. In the first regression we include dummies for statements on interest rates and the
euro category (statements on the future direction of the exchange rate, statements trying to explain the
position of the euro in the ECB monetary policy strategy, and statements on possible interventions; see
bottom half of Table 2). In the second regression we have replaced the dummy for statements on
interest rates by dummies for statements on the first and second pillar of the monetary policy strategy
of the ECB (statements on money growth, inflation, and the pass-through of the euro depreciation in
inflation). We present two regressions because of a possible simultaneity problem: statements on
variables like inflation and growth may influence the exchange rate as well as trigger statements on
rates. By estimating two equations, we try to separate these effects. The results are reported in Table 7.
In the first regression, the dummy for statements on possible intervention is the only variable
that is of importance in the mean equation (column 1 of Table 7). Interestingly, statements on possible
intervention initially cause a depreciation of the euro. The next day, the exchange rate appreciates with
the same amount. A Wald test confirms that the total effect over the two day period is not significantly
different from zero. The coefficient of the dummy reflecting statements on the future potential of the
euro is not significant in the mean equation. This leads us to conclude that the ECB has not been
successful in ‘talking up’ the euro. This result is in line with the findings of Fatum and Hutchison
(2002). However, statements on the future value of the euro have a significant effect in the variance
equation. Volatility is 30% lower on the day that statements on the euro are made. However, the day
after the statement was made volatility increases with 80%. 
These results for our second regression are comparable to those of the first. The difference is
that for intervention we now only find effects for the lagged value of the intervention dummy. This
also means that over the two day period, the effect is significantly different from zero. This result is in
line with the findings of Fatum and Hutchison (2002) on interventions. However, these authors have a
dummy reflecting the presence of rumors on interventions, while our dummy refers to statements of
ECB officials on interventions, which may not be the same.
In addition, we find a small effect of statements on inflation (appreciation of 0.07%) and
statements on pass-through of changes in the euro-dollar rate into inflation (depreciation of 0.21%).
The coefficient of the dummy for statements on the future potential of the euro is significant in the
variance equation. There is also evidence that statements on the trade-off between the euro as a target
and inflation have led to lower volatility. 19












Future euro -0.32** -0.33**
Future euro (1st lag) 0.52*** 0.49***










This table shows EGARCH models for the euro-dollar exchange rate (equations 3 and 4 in the main text). Column (1) reports
the results for the specification with dummies for statements on interest rates and dummies for statements on the future
direction of the exchange rate, statements trying to explain the position of the euro in the ECB monetary policy strategy, and
statements on possible interventions. Column (2) reports the results if the dummy for statements on interest rates is replaced
by dummies for statements on the two-pillar strategy of the euro (money growth, inflation, growth and pass-through of euro
depreciation in inflation). Only the significant coefficients are shown. Bollerslev-Woolridge robust standard errors and
covariance are used. */**/*** denotes significance at the 10/5/1 % level, respectively.20
Finally, we have used dummies that control for the message contained in a statement. This allows us
to make distinction between positive, neutral and negative statements. As before, we use two
regressions. The results are shown in Table 8.  
The first column shows that there are effects from statements on interest rates and on the euro
as a target versus inflation on the level of the exchange rate. Statements that indicate a rate rise are
followed by a depreciation of 0.36% the next day. This negative reaction may be explained by the
negative effect of an interest rate rise on economic growth. The results from the target versus inflation
category are interesting. Statements we classify as neutral coincide with a small depreciation (0.16%).
This may indicate that these types of statements have led to negative sentiments on currency markets.
Negative statements in this category (stressing that the euro is not a target) coincide with an
appreciation (0.13%). 
In the variance equation we find that volatility was lower on days during which positive
statements on the euro were made. However, the next day volatility was almost 70% higher. Both
neutral and negative statements on the role of the euro in the ECB monetary policy strategy coincide
with lower volatility. Statements raising the possibility of intervention lead to higher volatility during
the day, as may be expected, while the next day volatility is lower. Neutral statements on intervention
coincide with lower volatility, but the next day volatility shows a large increase.
In the second regression we find significant coefficients in the mean equation for M3 growth,
inflation, pass-through and intervention. Higher money growth seems to have a negative effect on the
exchange rate as it depreciates with 0.28%. Lower inflation produces positive effects: the euro
appreciates by 0.14%. Neutral statements on pass-through coincide with a depreciation of 0.18%.
Finally, merely talking about intervention can lead to results: the exchange rates appreciates with
0.25% after the day positive statements on intervention were made. 
All variables from the monetary policy main category enter the variance equation. Statements
on higher money growth and neutral statements on growth initially lead to lower volatility, whereas
statements on inflation and pass-through initially lead to higher volatility. In the cases of growth and
pass-through there is a contrary effect on the next day. The results for statements belonging to the euro
category are similar to those from the first regression. One difference is that positive statements on
intervention no longer lead to changes in volatility. 
So overall, we find that an asymmetric reaction to ‘news’: the market reacts differently to
positive and negative ‘news’. This is in line with the findings by Galati and Ho (2001), Fatum and
Hutchison (2002), and Andersen et al. (2002).21





Rates up (1st lag) -0.0036*** -
M3 up (1st lag) - -0.0028***
Inflation down - 0.0014**
Pass-through neutral - -0.0018***
No target versus inflation neutral  -0.0016** -
No target versus inflation negative (1st lag) 0.0013* -
Intervention positive (1st lag) - 0.0025*
Variance equation
Constant -4.64*** -4.54***
M3 up - -0.91***
Growth neutral - -0.86***
Growth neutral (1st lag) - 1.09***
Inflation up - 0.47***
Pass-through up - 0.65**
Pass-through up (1st lag) - -0.54**
Euro up -0.37** -0.41***
Euro up (1st lag) 0.46*** 0.51***
No target vs inflation neutral -0.63*** -0.86***
No target vs inflation neutral (1st lag) - 0.63**
No target vs inflation negative -0.52*** -
Intervention positive  0.75** -
Intervention positive (1st lag) -0.73* -
Intervention neutral -0.56** -0.81***









This table shows EGARCH models for the euro-dollar exchange rate (equations 3 and 4 in the main text). Column (1) reports
the results for the specification with dummies for statements on interest rates and dummies for statements on the future
direction of the exchange rate, statements trying to explain the position of the euro in the ECB monetary policy strategy, and
statements on possible interventions. Column (2) reports the results if the dummy for statements on interest rates is replaced
by dummies for statements on the two-pillar strategy of the euro (money growth, inflation, growth and pass-through of euro
depreciation in inflation). Only the significant coefficients are shown. Bollerslev-Woolridge robust standard errors and
covariance are used. */**/*** denotes significance at the 10/5/1 % level, respectively.23
6.  Concluding comments
Our results suggest that the effects of ECB statements on the level of the exchange rate are
comparatively small. Moreover, the effects are often not persistent: statements rarely have significant
effects over the two day period after the statement. However, in the case of volatility, ECB statements
have had considerable impact. Firstly, there is evidence that for the ECB officials as a group volatility
increases after policy statements are made. Secondly, more statement dummies show up in the
variance equation than in the mean equation. Thirdly, effects can be quite large. Our results indicate
that volatility may rise with as much as 25% after ECB statements. Our conclusion is, therefore, that
central banks should be careful with their comments, as in general volatility increases. One implication
may be, that in order to secure this, communication should be more centralized. National central banks
should step back and let the ECB president handle the communication to financial markets. 
Efforts of the ECB to ‘talk up’ the euro have been without result. Statements that were
intended to bolster up the external value of the euro did not lead to an appreciation, but only led to
higher volatility. As volatility increases uncertainty, the advice for the ECB seems to be not to use this
particular strategy again in the future. In contrast,  communications about intervention may have some
effect on the level of the exchange rate. If a central bank wants to intervene, talking about it before the
intervention takes place may therefore be worthwhile considering. 
We find evidence that certain statements on monetary policy have had influence on the level
of the exchange rate. In most cases the results show a negative relationship between interest rates and
the exchange rates and between inflation and the exchange rate. For example, indications of a rate rise
lead to a depreciation on the day following the statement. This may be seen as evidence for either an
inflation channel or a growth channel. Finally, there is evidence of asymmetric reactions to ‘news’.
Markets respond differently to positive or negative news from the same category. 24
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